Maine Law Court Holds Defamation Claim May Be Barred By Workers’
Compensation Act
Cole v. Chandler, Maine Supreme Judicial Court Decision 2000
ME 104 (May 26, 2000).
Cole was the controller of the Mead Corporation, Publishing Paper Division,
Rumford, and
the head of its Financial Department at the Rumford Paper Mill for
approximately seven months
during 1997. After a report that Cole had told a sexually explicit
joke, Mead began an investigation. In the course of the investigation
several minor incidents of inappropriate remarks surfaced. At the
conclusion of the investigation, Mead terminated Cole’s employment.
Cole sued two subordinate employees who reported these remarks and claimed
defamation,
false light invasion of privacy, interference with advantageous economic
relations and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Cole also sued Mead Corporation
alleging a theory of compelled
self-published defamation because having been told that he was being
terminated for sexual
harassment, Cole would have to reveal that reason in his search for
new employment. Thus each time Cole applied for a job he would be
compelled to republish the defamatory statements.
An appeal was taken from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of all
defendants.
With regard to the claim against Mead for compelled self-publication
defamation, the Law
Court refused to address the issue of whether it would recognize this
theory of recovery. The Law Court did so by finding that Mead was
protected by a conditional privilege under common law. The
Court found that a conditional privilege arises “in any situation in which
an important interest of the recipient of a defamatory statement will be
advanced by frank communication.” In this instance “Mead was entitled
to a conditional privilege . . . against a claim of slander brought by
one of its employees arising out of the termination of his employment relationship
with Mead.”
Cole attempted to argue that the conditional privilege was lost because
Mead abused its
discretion claiming the underlying “statements were false, because
the [subordinate employees] did not follow proper company procedure for
reporting a harassment claim, and because Mead did not thoroughly investigate
the claim before terminating him.” However, Cole could not overcome
the fact that the statements actually had been made and thus he could not
show the requisite reckless disregard for the truth nor could he show spite
or ill will.
With regard to the claims against the two subordinate employees, the
employees made a novel
argument that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation
Act barred recovery by Cole. Although this argument has been rejected
in other jurisdictions, the Superior Court granted summary
judgment on this basis.
In response to this question, the Law Court began by reciting its philosophy
that the Workers’
Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision is entitled to a broad construction.
Then the Court cited Li v. C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606 (Me.
1994), where a store employee was killed in a robbery which the employer
allegedly knew might happen and as to which it chose not to close the store
where the employee was working alone. There, the Law Court declined
to create a judicial exception to the exclusivity provision for an employer’s
intentional torts. In resolving the issue at bar, the Law Court said
that to determine whether a claim is barred by the exclusivity provision
a court must look to the “gist of the action and the nature of the damages
sought . . ..” The Law Court then held that any claim for damages
for personal injuries would fall within the exclusivity provision and thus
be barred. Any claim for economic injuries would not be barred.
Thus, with regard to Cole’s claims for defamation, invasion of privacy
and interference with advantageous economic relations, his claims would
be allowed to proceed but his remedies would be limited to economic injuries
only.
