
Labor Relations • Employment Law • Business Litigation
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On June 28, 1998, the United States Supreme Court handed down two decisions
defining an employer’s potential liability under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, for its supervisory employees’ acts of
sexual harassment. The two decisions, Farragher v. City of
Boca Raton, and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, accordingly warrant
careful attention in re-evaluating current employment policies and practices,
and in planning responses to future incidents.
The Faragher and Ellerth decisions hold
that, while these two legal theories remain useful in determining whether
a supervisor’s conduct constituted unlawful sexual harassment, courts will
no longer focus on the technical distinction between hostile environment
and quid pro quo allegations when determining whether an
employer is liable for a supervisor’s proven act of unlawful sexual harassment.
Rather, a distinction will now be drawn between cases where any tangible
job action is taken against the "plaintiff-victim" by the offending supervisor,
and cases in which no tangible job action is taken (in other words, the
"plaintiff-victim" either remains employed, or quits her job). Where
a "tangible job action" is taken by the harassing supervisor, the employer
now faces strict liability. Where no tangible job action is taken,
the employer remains vicariously liable for the supervisor’s sexual harassment,
but may avail itself of an affirmative defense relating to its efforts
to prevent the harassment from occurring in the first place.1 These
decisions have important implications in how employers must structure the
workplace in order to avoid liability.
1 Note that there is an implicit distinction suggested in these cases between tangible job actions taken by a supervisor, and an employee’s decision to quit his or her job, even where he or she alleges that she was "compelled" to quit because of sexual harassment. While "tangible job action" is broadly interpreted to include any type of demotion or suspension, as well as terminations, the facts adjudicated in Faragher and Ellerth suggest that the term does not include "constructive discharges," where, for example, a plaintiff quits his or her job on the grounds that sexual harassment rendered the workplace unbearable. The Faragher and Ellerth Court reasoned that, where a supervisor uses his or her delegated authority to take a tangible employment action against a subordinate, it is appropriate to hold the employer strictly liable for any abuse of that delegated authority. In contrast, where a supervisor constantly harasses his or her victim, but does not initiate any employment action against his or her victim, the Court apparently reasoned that there is not a sufficient connection between the supervisor’s abuse of delegated authority and the supervisor’s acts of sexual harassment to warrant the imposition of strict liability. While only a supervisor can demote or fire an employee – a power not held by co-workers -- any employee acting purely for his own amusement could create an unbearable work environment for a co-worker. Consequently, although a plaintiff who is compelled to quit her job due to severe sexual harassment has experienced a type of adverse job action -- a constructive discharge – the Court will view that situation differently because it does not involve the type of abuse of a legitimately-delegated authority by the supervisor that occurs in a case where the harassing supervisor initiates a tangible employment action. While a supervisor’s harassment which triggers a constructive discharge will still result in vicarious liability, that liability will be subject to the employer’s affirmative defense that it took reasonable care to prevent the harassment and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail himself or herself of preventative or corrective opportunities. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton arose out of a female lifeguard's experience in Boca Raton’s Marine Safety Division from 1985 to 1990. Beth Faragher had three immediate supervisors: Terry, Silverman, and Gordon. Over the course of her five-year tenure, Terry and Silverman repeatedly groped Ms. Faragher and other female lifeguards on their staff, and made dozens of comments, gestures and jokes of an explicitly sexual nature. The City of Boca Raton issued a sexual harassment policy in 1986, which was revised and reissued in 1990. Unfortunately the policy was never distributed to the Marine Safety Division in which Faragher was employed, with the result that Terry, Silverman, Gordon, and their subordinate lifeguards were unaware of its existence. Faragher spoke to Gordon about Terry and Silverman’s behavior on several occasions, but she never made any type of formal complaint to the City. Two months prior to Faragher’s resignation, another female lifeguard did formally complain by letter to the City’s Personnel Director about Terry and Silverman’s behavior. The City investigated, found that the women had behaved improperly, reprimanded them, and required them to choose between a suspension without pay or forfeiture of annual leave. Faragher resigned two months later and filed a hostile work environment claim against the City of Boca Raton pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, as amended, seeking nominal damages, costs, and attorneys fees. The District Court initially found in Faragher’s favor, reasoning that the sexual harassment was sufficiently pervasive to conclude that the City had constructive knowledge of Terry and Silverman’s harassment. The United States Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the City, reasoning that Terry and Silverman were not acting within the scope of their employment. The Court of Appeals also found that Terry and Silverman’s "agency relationship" with the City did not assist them in harassing Ms. Faragher because they never threatened to fire or demote her. The Supreme Court framed the issue before it as determining the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable under Title VII for a supervisory employee's actions in creating a hostile work environment. The Court held that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable harassment by a supervisor, subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim.2
2 In the course of its decision, the Faragher Court reiterated that, in order to be actionable, sexual harassment must be so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and creates an abusive working environment. As has been the case under previously established Supreme Court precedent, the conduct is to be evaluated under all relevant circumstances, such as frequency, severity, and the occurrence of any physical intimidation. "These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘generalcivility code.’ . . . Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’" The decision of the Court addressed a variety of different theories, wrestling with the issue of where it should draw the line on an employer's vicarious responsibility. Ultimately, the Court held that, wherein employee can establish that a supervisor created a hostile work environment through severe or pervasive acts of sexual harassment, then the employer will be held vicariously liable for that harassment, subject to an affirmative defense. So long as no tangible job action was taken by the supervisor against the employee (in other words, the victim remains employed or resigns, and is not demoted nor fired by the supervisor), an employer can avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior; and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. The Court explained that, while a harassment policy is not always required, the presence of a policy will be an issue in demonstrating reasonable care. Moreover, the Court noted that an employer would generally be able to meet its burden of proof in any case where a victim failed to take advantage of a reasonable complaint procedure provided by the employer. Because Boca Raton failed to distribute its policy to the Marine Safety Division, the Court concluded there was no point in remanding the case to the lower court to permit the City to attempt to establish the affirmative defense of reasonable care. Under the law as it existed prior to the issuance of the Faragher decision, it has generally been the case that an employer could avoid liability for a supervisor’s creation of a hostile work environment by demonstrating that it took prompt corrective action, once notified of the plaintiff's complaints, or that it had no notice, constructive or otherwise, that the harassment occurred. Faragher shifts the emphasis from demonstrating a lack of notice or from proving a reactive response, to focusing upon the employer’s overall exercise of reasonable care in trying to prevent the harassment in the first place. It thereby emphasizes the importance of (1) clearly stated zero- tolerance sexual harassment policies, including instructions to any potential victims to by-pass offending supervisors when making internal complaints; (2) the effective distribution and dissemination of those policies; and (3) the use of training and other preventative procedures for supervisory personnel, and, optimally, for all personnel on a regular basis. Most important, Faragher holds that, if a supervisor’s harassment "culminates" in taking some adverse job action against his or her subordinate victim, the employer will beheld strictly liable for that action even if the employer did not know about the harassment and even if the employer made every reasonable effort to keep it from occurring. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the companion case to Faragher, stemmed from a supervisor’s remarks which plainly threatened his subordinate’s employment in connection with the supervisor's accompanying sexual advances, and yet those threats were never carried out in any way. The offending supervisor in Ellerth, Ted Slowik, was a mid-level supervisor, whose authority to hire and fire subordinates was subject to the approval of a higher-ranking supervisor. Over the course of Kimberly Ellerth’s fifteen-month employment with Burlington, Slowik subjected her to a series of remarks in which he linked Ellerth’s prospects for success at Burlington to her willingness to engage in sexual activities. Although Burlington had a sexual harassment policy in place, containing internal complaint procedures, Ellerth never complained. Instead, she resigned her employment, initially providing reasons unrelated to the sexual harassment. Three weeks later, Ellerth sent a letter to Burlington indicating that she quit because of Slowik’s behavior. She then sued Burlington, alleging that she was sexually harassed and forced to resign from her job in violation of Title VII. The District Court awarded summary judgment to Burlington, finding it had no knowledge or reason to know of the harassment. The United States Court of Appeals reversed on the question of Burlington’s vicarious liability in a decision that was so fragmented that it produced eight separate opinions. The Supreme Court first held that a supervisor’s unfulfilled threats do
not give rise to a quid pro quo claim, but, rather, are to be analyzed under the hostile work environment theory. That
conclusion seems consistent with existing law, and confirms the highly controversial ruling
in the Paula Jones v. Clinton case in which Jones' case was
dismissed by the District Court where she could not demonstrate that she
was fired or demoted in connection with the Clinton incident. On
the facts of Ellerth’s case, it was clear that Slowik’s conduct created a hostile work environment.
The Court stated: "an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance
of the evidence." The Court went on to restate the affirmative defense
also articulated in Faragher: (a) the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities presented by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise. The Court then concluded that the case should
be sent back to the lower court so that Faragher could present any evidence
as to whether she suffered a tangible job action by Slowik (her resignation
was therefore implicitly not sufficient), and so that Burlington Industries
could establish its affirmative defense of reasonable care, assuming that
Faragher could not prove that Slowik implemented some tangible job action
against her.
Clear implications emerge from the Ellerth and Farragher decisions, the solutions to which, in many instances, are already in place. Thus, we strongly recommend that you take the following actions if your company has not already done so. First, it is more important than ever before for every employer to have a clearly-stated, strongly worded sexual harassment policy in place. Such
a policy should state the company’s goal of zero tolerance for all types of harassment and should provide a process for a victim to make
a complaint.
The policy should explain the complaint resolution process in some detail
and should provide for more than one person to whom an employee can complain.
Having two such persons provides a solution to the situation where the harasser
and the "complaint-receiver" happen to be the same person. In addition,
the policy should be written in very basic language, such that every employee
can understand the policy. The policy also should include real life examples
of what is sexual harassment in order to help avoid misunderstandings.
Finally, the policy should address issues such as confidentiality, retaliation
and the consequences to an employee who engages in unlawful harassment.
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